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v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426
(1978); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 17 C.Ed.2d 705 (1967); and White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) to support
this proposition.
In this case the Court stressed that the effect of the Sixth
Amendment violation is limited to the admission into evidence
of Dr. Grigson's testimony at the sentencing hearing. Conse-
quently, the error did not pervade the entire proceeding. Never-
theless, the erroneous admission of the psychiatric testimony
might have affected the capital sentencing jury and accordingly,
the court held that the Chapman harmless error rule applies to
the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith. The Court, citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967) stated
that the question to be addressed is whether the State has prov-
ed beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained. Here the Court found
that Dr. Grigson's testimony "stands out both because of his
qualifications as a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry and
the powerful content of his message ... he told the jury that
Satterwhite was beyond the reach of psychiatric rehabilita-
tion."108 S.Ct. at 1799. Accordingly, the Court found the error
not to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reversed the
judgment of the Texas court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it
affirmed Satterwhite's death sentence and remanded the case
for further proceedings.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
In Virginia as in Texas, the finding of future dangerousness
can be critical to the imposition of the death sentence.
§19.2-264.2 of the Virginia Code enumerates the conditions for
the imposition of the death sentence in language very similar to
that cited by the court in Satterwhite at 1798. The Virginia code
states; "In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an
offense for which the death penalty may be imposed, a sentence
of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury
shall... find that there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society. ." Va. Code Ann.,
§19.2-264.2 (1983).
The Commonwealth must comply with the Sixth Amend-
ment requirement set out in Estelle v. Smith, that defense
counsel be given advance notice of a psychiatric examination
encompassing the issue of future dangerousness. Under the
Court's application of the Chapman harmless error analysis,
failure to comply with the notice requirement, coupled with a
failure on the part of the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained, may result in reversal. It is important to note,
that admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of this Sixth
Amendment right to notice will not result in automatic reversal
(as is the case in which the violation of a Sixth Amendment
right affects the entire criminal proceeding), but neither will it
easily be deemed harmless error. (Cecilia A. McGlew)
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FACTS
On May 4, 1982 Cartwright killed his employers Mr. and
Mrs. Hugh Riddle in their Oklahoma home. He shot and killed
Mr. Riddle, shot and stabbed Mrs. Riddle, and slit her throat.
The trial court found Cartwright guilty of first degree murder,
and sentenced him to death. The jury based the sentence, in
part, on the aggravating circumstances that the murder was
'especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." Okla. Stat, tit 21, §
701.12(4)(19 ). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals af-
firmed on direct appeal, Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, cert
denied, 473 U.S. 911, 87 L.Ed.2d 661, 105 S.Ct. 3538 (1983),
and affirmed denial of state habeas corpus. Cartwright v. State,
708 P.2d 592 (1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1073, 88 L.Ed. 2d
808, 106 S.Ct. 837 (1986). The United States District Court
denied federal habeas corpus relief. A panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 802 F.2d 1203 (1986),
but after rehearing en bane granted relief on the limited claim
challenging as unconstitutionally vague the aggravating cir-
cumstance that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel."
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sitting en bane
considered the vagueness challenge to the aggravating cir-
cumstance and ruled that the words "heinous," "atrocious"
and "cruel" were unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the
words did not direct the jury's discretion in deciding when the
death penalty is appropriate.
Petitioner Maynard sought review of the Tenth Circuit's
holding that the aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally
vague in the Supreme Court of the United States.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held unconstituionally
vague the statutory aggravating factor that the murder be
"heinous, atrocious or cruel." Title 21, §701.12(4). Maynard v.
Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1860 (1988):
Godfrey and Maynard compared
a) Godfrey v. Georgia as Controlling Precedent.
The United States Supreme Court saw its decision in God-
frey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) as controlling in this case.
In Godfrey, the aggravating factor in the Georgia Statute re-
quired that the murder be "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhumane in that it involved torture, depravity or an
aggravated battery to the victim." Ga. Code § 27-2534.1
(b)(7)(1978). The sentencing jury based the appropriateness of
the death penalty on the finding that the murder was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane." God-
frey, 446 U.S. at 426. The jury did not mention whether the
murder "involved torture, depravity or an aggravated battery to
the victim." Id. The United States Supreme Court decided that
such an application of the aggravating factor was unconstitu-
tional, saying that "there is nothing in these few words, stan-
ding alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary
and capricious infliction of the death sentence." Godfrey, 446
U.S. at 428. The Court also stated that the jury could think
that any intentional taking of life was 'outrageously or wanton-
ly vile, horrible or inhumane." Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-429.
b) Aggravating circumstances in Maynard and Godfrey
equated.
In Maynard the Court of the United States held that the
Oklahoma aggravating circumstance that the murder was
"heinous, attrocious or cruel," title 21, section 701.12(4) of the
Oklahoma Statutes, and the Georgia aggravating factor as ex-
pressed in Godfrey that the murder be "outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhumane," section 27-2543.1 (b)(7) of
the Georgia Code, violate the discretion guidance requirements
outlined in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238(1972) and Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Maynard, 108 S.Ct. at 1858,
1859. The Court stated that the legislature must guide both the
discretion of the jury, and also the discretion of the judge so
that the reviewing court can decide if evidence presented at the
sentencing stage is sufficient to support a capital sentence. Id.
at 1858.
c) Aggravating circumstances in Maynard and Godfrey
distinguished.
It is clear from both Godfrey and Maynard that both
statutory aggravating factors are unconstitutionally vague under
the Eighth Amendment's guidance of discretion requirement. In
Godfrey, the state Supreme Court was found to have given an
acceptably limiting construction but not applied it to Godfrey's
case. In Maynard, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was found to
have set no standard for itself to give any meaning or content
to the factor. The Oklahoma court simply reviewed all the cir-
cumstances and decided whether the facts made out the vileness
circumstance.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
The Virginia statutory aggravating factor is identical to the
aggravating factor at issue in Godfrey. Va. Code Ann. §
19.2-264.4 (C)(1988). Thus, the Virginia aggravating factor is
unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.
Prosecutors may argue several ways to save the Virginia fac-
tor. In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision
in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct 546 (1988), an argument can
be made that the Virginia statutory definition of capital murder,
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(1988), sufficiently narrows the jury's
discretion in the guilt stage, thus making a sentence based on
an unconstitutional aggravating factor harmless error. This is a
weak argument due to the major differences between the
Virginia aggravating factors, and the factor at issue in Lowen-
field. (See discussion of Lowenfield v. Phelps, infra.) We must
await further analysis by the court as to the significance of
these differences.
Another argument stems from the Virginia Supreme Court's
further definition of both depravity of mind and aggravated
battery. The Virginia Supreme Court has held that the jury
must specifically find the statutory elements of torture, ag-
gravated battery or depravity of mind to sentence the defendant
to death. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S.E.2d
36 (1980). No definition for torture exists. In Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), the court defin-
ed an aggravated battery as "a battery which, qualitatively and
quantitatively is more culpable than the minimum necessary to
commit an act of murder." Id. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149. The
Virginia Supreme Court defined depravity as "a degree of
moral turpitude and psychological debasement surpassing that
inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and
premeditation." Id. It is arguable that these definitions are not
sufficient to narrow the jury's discretion, and that in reality,
they do not constitute a "narrowing construction," but lead to
the confusion and affirmative misguidance of the jury.
Therefore, the question is whether, if communicated to the
jury, the Turner and Smith "limiting" constructions save the
Virginia factor. It is arguable that they do not. (Sandra Fischer)
